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3 Blondel Party Government: Myth or Reality? 
Abstract 
The question of the relationship between parties and the governments which 
they support has not so far been given the attention it deserves. This is 
surprising from both a normative and an empirical standpoint. The reasons 
why this question has not been studied so far have probably to do with the 
notion, held unconsciously but also strongly, that the problem is a simple 
one. As with all matters which are understudied, there is some tendency to 
simplify and in this case to believe that parliamentary government, in 
Western Europe at least, is party government. Yet, as one looks more 
closely at the problem, the simplicity of the answer begins to vanish. What 
we therefore need to do, first, is to examine what the expression ‘party 
government’ really means. This examination will begin to raise in our minds 
questions about the validity of the ‘idealised concept’ of party government. 
This will lead us to adopt a more sedate view of what party government 
consists of as well as to notice that there are substantial variations in the 
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5 Blondel Party Government: Myth or Reality? 
Rather surprisingly, the question of the relationship between parties and the 
governments which they support has not so far been given the attention it 
deserves. This is surprising from both a normative and an empirical 
standpoint. It is rather curious that there should not have been a desire to 
know better how parties interfaced with governments; it is also surprising 
that the normative question should not have been discussed, especially 
since executive-legislative relations have been a major area of inquiry: this 
topic can be regarded as parallel to but in part superseded by, at least in 
cabinet systems, the question of government-party relationships. For, in 
contemporary democracies, one of the major questions to be answered is 
surely how close should the link be between government and supporting 
parties. Is the executive to be composed of men and women chosen and 
tightly controlled by the party? Are the policies which that executive 
pursues to originate from the party or parties supporting the government? 
These are major questions for democratic governments which must be 
discussed alongside empirical problems, such as efficiency and 
effectiveness, which need of course also to be raised. 
The reasons why these questions have not been studied so far have 
probably to do with two somewhat contradictory points. One is the long-
standing dislike of parties: although criticisms have now been toned down, 
to be sure, there is still in many quarters a lingering view that parties play 
an ‘excessive’ part in government. The other point is the notion, held 
unconsciously but also strongly, that the question is a simple one. As with 
all matters which are understudied, there is some tendency to simplify and 
in this case to believe that parliamentary government, in Western Europe at 
least, is party government. Since electors vote for parties and only 
incidentally for individuals, except in the case of party leaders, and since 
parties are involved in the government formation process, the conclusion 
that the government is party government seems inescapable. This view is 
reinforced by the fact that parties are fairly stable, at least have been stable 
until recently in Western Europe, and that they are disciplined. Thus the 
government is composed of party men and women who can count on the 
loyalty of their parliamentary supporters. If this is not party government, 
what is and what can it be? 
Yet, as one looks more closely at the problem, the simplicity of the 
answer begins to vanish. For instance, to what extent are the parties which 
support a government truly involved in the life of that government? One 
knows of many cases in which these parties are on the contrary rather 
distant from the making of policies. As a matter of fact, would it be such a 
good thing for these parties to be too closely involved? Thus we may not be 
so sure in practice of what we mean, or wish to mean, when we speak of 
party government. 
What we therefore need to do, first, is to examine what the expression 
‘party government’ really means. This examination will begin to raise in our 
minds questions about the validity of the ‘idealised concept’ of party 
government. This will lead us to adopt a more sedate view of what party 
government consists of as well as to notice that there are substantial 
variations in the content of party government in different countries. 
6 IHS Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 20 
I. 
1. What Party Government Consists of 
Our first task is therefore to be more precise about what constitutes party 
government. To do so, conceptual difficulties surrounding the expression 
have to be overcome. Some definitions are not helpful. For instance, one 
cannot be satisfied with one which states that party government is “that 
form of societal conflict regulation in which a plurality of democratically 
organised political parties play a relatively dominant role both in the socio-
political mediation sphere and in the actual process of political decision-
making (government sphere)”1. Such a ‘definition’ (if the word applies in this 
case) says little that can be useful for practical purposes: what is a 
‘relatively dominant role’ is manifestly highly debatable. Moreover, the 
definition seems to assume that a government is either party or non party, 
which is not always the case, would it only be because in some 
governments ministers may or may not belong to parties. 
Perhaps the most systematic effort to define the concept has been 
that of R.S. Katz who has developed an incremental idea of ‘partyness of 
government’ as well as of ‘party governmentness’ in an essay entitled ‘Party 
government: a rationalistic conception’2. He mentions three conditions 
which have to be fulfilled for a government to deserve the title, so to speak, 
of ‘party government’. These are, first, that “all major governmental 
decisions must be taken by people chosen in elections conducted along 
party lines, or by individuals appointed by and responsible to such people”, 
second, that “policy must be decided within the governing party, when there 
is a ‘monocolour’ government, or by negotiation among parties when there 
is a coalition”, and, third, that “the highest officials (e.g. cabinet ministers 
and especially the prime minister) must be selected within their parties and 
be responsible to the people through their parties”.3 R.S. Katz then goes on 
to note that this definition “represents an ideal type, rather like but in 
contrast to Dahl’s (1971) type of polyarchy. As such, it represents an 
extreme that may be approximated but is neither realised nor realisable in 
the ultimate sense. It is also a multidimensional concept. Thus a particular 
system may closely approximate the ideal type in one respect but not in 
another”.4 R.S. Katz’s analysis shows therefore that the problem of defining 
party government is complex; equally interestingly, it also suggests that 
one should look for ‘types’ of party government. It is somewhat imprecise on 
one point, admittedly, namely on the determination of what constitute 
“major governmental decisions”; but it has the great merit of stressing that a 
very important link is provided by individuals in the context of policy 
development. The interpretation does not posit that all the policies adopted 
by governments must have been adopted previously by supporting parties: it 
suffices that they be approved “within the government party”, a somewhat 
less rigid expression. Whether this flexibility was indeed deliberate cannot 
be discovered from the context; but it is consistent with the general tone of 
the approach which places government members in a central position. 
 
1 A. Mintzel and H. Schmitt (1981) ‘How to investigate the future of party government’ 
(unpublished), quoted in R.S. Katz, ‘Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception’, F.G. 
Castles and R. Wildenmann, eds., op.cit. (1986), p. 42 
2 R.S. Katz, ‘Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception’, in F.G. Castles and R. 
Wildenmann, eds., Visions and Realities of Party Government (1986) Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 
42 and foll 
3 ibid , p. 43. 
4 ibid , p. 44 
7 Blondel Party Government: Myth or Reality? 
2. The Direction of Influence 
Katz’s analysis further suggests that we have to examine more closely the 
characteristics of party government-relationships. This means taking into 
account two broad sets of questions which were traditionally ignored. One 
is the question of the direction of the influence; the other is that of the 
planes on which this influence takes place. 
The question of the direction of the influence needs to be raised 
because governments, far from being always the ‘obedient servants’ of 
parties, can and often do, on the contrary, supervise and even control these 
parties. Admittedly, in principle, the concept of party government does not 
in itself rule out the possibility for the relationship of influence to go from 
governments to parties as well as from parties to governments; but the fact 
that the influence could take place in both ways seems overlooked as the 
idea of party-government appears based on the assumption, somewhat 
naive perhaps and almost certainly ideologically-grounded, according to 
which parties are the source of the influence. This view appears ideological 
as it stems in part from neo-corporatist models and indeed from marxist 
models according to which the government is the last element of a chain 
which goes from the socio-economic environment to political decision-
making.5 We do not need here to go into the reasons why such a view is 
likely to be mistaken: it suffices to point out that that it is a hypothesis and, 
as a result, needs to be tested and not assumed. We must therefore see 
whether there are cases in which governments influence the parties which 
support them as well as cases in which supporting parties influence 
governments. 
By broadening the approach in this way, however, we discover two 
important consequences. First, as there can be both types of influence, 
they can both occur at the same time: there can therefore be (and indeed 
there is likely to be) reciprocal influence of governments on suppporting 
parties as well as of supporting parties on governments over the same 
question. This may result in both types of influence being so evenly 
balanced that they cancel each other out. Hence the further conclusion that 
there may well be, in some cases, true autonomy between parties and 
governments, as each side realises that it cannot force the other to accept 
its wishes.  
Thus the idea of party government contains within itself, so to speak, 
‘the seeds of its own destruction’: a party-government relationship must 
also include the possibility for parties and governments to ‘declare a truce’ 
and go about their own business ‘independently’. 
3. The three Planes of Party-Government Relationships 
The direction of influence can therefore vary in party-governments 
relationships; this influence is also exercised on the different planes on 
which governments and parties relate to each other. These planes are 
independent from each other, but, in part at least, they also intersect each 
other. 
There are three planes on which parties and governments can interact, 
although the literature has tended to concentrate on two of them. Indeed, 
there has even sometimes been emphasis on one plane only, that of the 
allocation of portfolios among the various parties, the underlying assumption 
being that the main way in which parties intervene in the governmental 
 
5 F. Lehner and K. Schubert, ‘Party Government and the Political Control of Public Policy’, 
EJPR, (1984), vol. 12,  131-46, p. 134 
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process is through the composition of the government: parties want to 
achieve ‘power’ and membership of the government is the way to fulfil this 
aim; moreover, it is in any case easier to measure the involvement of parties 
in government if the key indicator is the number of ministers of these 
parties. This approach is justifiable: participation in a government appears to 
give a party a substantial opportunity to have a say in decision-making. 
Yet there are difficulties if this approach is adopted. Some ministers 
may be more powerful than others, to begin with: in a coalition a party may 
be at a disadvantage as a result. Furthermore, it is dangerous to rely on the 
proportion of ministers held by a party in a government to assess the power 
of that party: a study relating to the influence of the FDP in the German 
government provides clear evidence that that party has been 
disproportionately successful in seeing its policies adopted. Finally, some 
governments are supported by parties which do not participate in it: in such 
a case the pay-off for the party is ocnstituted by policies and only by 
policies. Thus to be realistic, on cannot merely take into account the 
composition of the government; one has to examine policies and 
government-party relationships have to be assessesed separately on these 
two planes. 
Indeed, a third plane needs to be considered, that of patronage, which, 
in some countries at least, plays an important part, although that part is 
typically difficult to measure. It is in reality also difficult to determine 
precisely what constitutes patronage. In some cases, favours may be 
regarded as being ‘policies’, applying to some groups or some areas only, 
admittedly, but of the same kind as the national policies which parties put 
forward; some national policies are even occasionally regarded as ‘bribes’ 
designed to capture segments of the electorate. Yet, by and large, 
patronage relates to small numbers of individuals or to specific districts, 
typically in order to obtain electoral support. These favours are indeed 
conceived as different from party policies by the parties themselves, since 
they are often asked for in secret or at least have an ‘unofficial’ character. 
Patronage must therefore be regarded as forming a distinct plane of 
government-supporting party relationships. 
Indeed, one must view patronage as a distinct plane of government-
supporting party relationships precisely because, being typically secret and 
ostensibly unacceptable, the extent to which it takes place or is tolerated 
varies markedly from country to country. Where the political culture 
considers patronage as interfering in an unwarranted manner with the 
‘proper’ working of administrative bodies, it tends to be restricted and, at the 
limit, may only exist on a minute scale. In other countries, on the contrary, 
it may take place on a large scale. 
Where it does exist, on the other hand, its main function is to help the 
decision-making process. It can help parties to ensure the loyalty of their 
supporters; it can also help governments to put pressure on parties. By 
giving favours to individual party members of a particular district, a 
government may ensure the continued support of the party members in that 
district: its proposals may therefore be more readily accepted. Admittedly, 
patronage is not the only mechanism by which trade-offs occur: for instance 
a party may be prepared to receive relatively few ministerial posts in 
exchange for policies which the government is prepared to implement. 
Trade-offs occur also within the plane of policies, both among the parties 
and between the government and the parties which support this government. 
There is thus a continuous series of exchange arrangements characterising 
government-supporting party relationships; but patronage is an important 
element in this ongoing relationship and it needs to be examined on its own 
right. 
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II. 
4. The Marked Limits of the Influence of Parties  
on Governments 
While examining the ways in which governments and supporting parties 
interact, we noticed some of the ways in which governments exercise 
influence on these supporting parties or find means of reducing the impact 
of these parties on them. This means that we have come to discover that 
there are marked limits to the influence which supporting parties exercise in 
practice on governments, even in parliamentary systems, although these 
systems are typically regarded as those which are most likely to give rise 
to party government. To appreciate better what the limits of party influence 
can be, let us consider a little more closely the situation on the three 
planes on which, as we just saw, government-supporting party relationships 
take place, appointments, policy-making, and patronage. 
First, with respect to appointments, one serious limitation to the role of 
parties come from the fact that ministers are often not appointed by party 
representatives as such: in many countries, in Britain for instance, it is the 
prime minister who selects the ministers, not the party. Admittedly, in the 
British case, there is so to speak a ‘transfer’ to the government of the 
(parliamentary) party elite when a party comes to power after winning an 
election; but, even then, the prime minister has some leeway and this 
leeway increases as time passes. In other countries, the limitation of the 
role of parties is sometimes due to another reason, namely the fact that 
some ministers are chosen from outside the ranks of the party, for instance 
from among civil servants or businessmen. 
Second and similarly, the role of parties may be limited with respect to 
patronage, as this may or may not be distributed by the party iself. It may 
be distributed, in part at least, by the members of the government who may 
follow their own inclinations rather than party instructions. The party may be 
helped in the process, but more as a passive instrument than as an actor. 
Third, the role of parties may also be markedly restricted with respect 
to policy-making. Admittedly, when a new government is formed, especially 
after a general election, this government tends to follow the party 
programme or, if a coalition has to be formed, the government programme 
stems from the programmes of the coalition parties. Yet, even then, 
aspects of the party programme may be toned down or some proposals 
may be delayed. Moreover, some proposals may have been included in the 
party programme at the request of ministers and not of the rank-and-file. 
Finally, the influence of the government on governmental policy-making 
tends to increase over time: circumstances induce ministers to inflect, 
modify, indeed sometimes entirely alter the policies which had been 
originally contemplated: examples of complete ‘U-turns’ even occur 
occasionally. In such cases, parties are often presented with a fait 
accompli. 
5. Factors Accounting for Variations in the ‘Partyness’  
of Governments 
Why, then, do limitations in the influence of parties on governments occur 
and why do they vary across countries? Although our knowledge is still 
limited and it is impossible to be really rpecise, one can at least note the 
influence of five broad types of factors which increase or reduce the hold 
which parties may have on governments. These are the institutional 
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framework, the party system, the structure of parties, the nature of 
leadership, and the characteristics of the policies themselves. 
a) The Institutional Framework 
National institutions are likely to have an effect on government-supporting 
party relationships, as the link between parties and governments may be 
more or less close depending on whether these institutions give or not 
direct authority to some members of the executive. Presidents in 
presidential systems such as that of the United States enjoy such direct 
authority: they can therefore exercise personal influence independently from 
parties. A somewhat similar situation occurs in those parliamentary 
systems in which the head of State has substantial political authority of his 
or her own, as in France or Finland; this can also occur where the head of 
the government, as in Britain or Germany, is granted significant personal 
authority by custom or as a result of constitutional provisions. In all these 
cases, government-party relationships are affected. For instance, the part 
played by the British prime minister in relation to appointments is 
substantial, because the superior status of the British prime minister is 
recognised in practice; for the same reason the British prime minister 
exercises considerable influence on the policy plane. 
b) Party Systems 
The character of government-party relationships is also likely to be affected 
by the type of party system. The way members of governments are 
appointed, the decision-making processes, even the existence and nature 
of patronage will vary as a result. The impact is indirect, but it is strong: the 
impact is indirect in that governments will typically be of a majority single-
party character, of a minority single party character, or be based on a 
coalition as a result of the party system. Let us therefore consider these 
three types of government in turn. 
In single party majority governments, typically to be found in two-party 
systems, as in Britain, or in systems of more than two parties where one 
party is dominant, for instance in Sweden and, in earlier decades, Norway, 
the government plays a considerable part in policy elaboration; this is also 
the case in coalitions with a dominant party. Admittedly, the sole or major 
party comes to office with a programme, typically adopted previously by the 
party executive or the national conference; but over time the influence of the 
government grows. The same obtains with respect to the composition of the 
government and of the top party elite: originally, members of the government 
emerge from the party, and indeed from senior elements in the party: there 
is then a true fusion between the membership of the government and of the 
party elite; over time, this fusion works to the benefit of the government 
rather to that of the party elite. Finally, patronage tends to be limited: the 
cohesion of the party and the national character of the electoral contests 
make the distribution of favours on a large scale less necessary. 
The characteristics of most other coalition governments are different. In 
most coalitions, membership of the government is typically decided by top 
party representatives: the names of ministers are sometimes simply 
forwarded to the prime minister. Patronage is often widespread, in large part 
because each party needs to ensure that it keeps the loyalty of its 
supporters. Finally, party representatives have a major say in governmental 
policy-making: the influence of these representatives is typically exercised 
by means of a governmental compact, often very detailed, by which the 
parties determine in advance the line which the government is to take on 
most, if not all, issues. 
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Minority single party (and minority coalition) governments constitute 
intermediate cases. First, only the party (or parties) represented in the 
government play a part in determining the composition of that government: 
there is thus only partial party influence at this level. Second, what begins 
by a substantial amount of party dominance on policy elaboration (including 
by the parties supporting the government from outside) gradually gives way 
to a substantial degree of governmental initiative and indeed even of 
governmental autonomy, partly reminiscent of constitutional presidential 
systems: the government proposes policies and attempts to obtain support 
for these policies among the coalition partners. Party dominance is 
therefore limited: an ‘arms length’ situation prevails. The extent of patronage 
is also intermediate. There is usually more patronage than when there is 
single party majority government but less than where there are coalitions. 
c) Party Structure and Ideology 
Internal party characteristics also have an impact on government-supporting 
party relationships. First, the ideology of the parties has an effect, as 
parties of the Left are more likely to want to intervene in the life of the 
government which they support than parties of the Right: such ‘interference’ 
is viewed on the Left as a manifestation of ‘democratic participation’. 
Second, the general characteristics of the party can also be expected 
to have an impact. On the one hand, ‘mobilising’ parties are set up in order 
to increase the dominant role of the leadership, which can be the leadership 
of the party (in the case of many Communist parties) or the leadership of 
the government (in the case of well-organised parties of the authoritarian 
Right): the party rank-and-file may have little to say. On the other hand, 
‘representative’ parties seem more likely to attempt to influence 
governments; but the fact that they have a large social base does not 
automatically provide them with such an influence, as these parties may be 
so decentralised and divided that they are unable to affect the government 
as parties; only elements in their midst may put pressure and have 
influence: this is the case, for instance, with American parties. 
Finally, the specific party structure also has an effect on government-
party relationships. In parties which are ‘cohesive’, decisions are taken 
primarily at the top, though there may be some consultation of the rank-
and-file. Some parties have two power centres, often partly overlapping, 
admittedly, typically the parliamentary group and the national executive: the 
government may play on divisions between these two bodies. There are also 
factionalised or geographically-divided parties: in these cases, decisions 
taken by the party leadership may be challenged locally; there may not 
even be party positions as such and the government may be better able to 
determine its policy autonomously as a result, though it may not be able to 
see its views eventually prevail. There are thus two contradictory 
consequences of party structure: on the one hand, the more cohesive the 
party is, the more it is able to exercise influence as a party; on the other 
hand, the more the party displays cohesion, the more the government is 
able to exercise influence mainly by controlling the top of the organisation. 
In reality, where parties have little cohesion, there is no real 
opportunity for either party dominance or for government dominance. There 
would then seem to be autonomy for the government and for the party; 
indeed it is not so much the party as such which is autonomous, since this 
expression covers little reality in such a case: the autonomous agents are 
the party ‘chieftains’ who can exercise influence, often because they are 
members of the legislature. The case of the French Fourth Republic 
approximated this situation. 
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d) Leadership 
Three types of leaders are particularly relevant, those who are governmental 
leaders only, those who are party leaders only, and those who combine 
governmental and party leadership. The first type includes presidential chief 
executives who come to power on the basis of popular, rather than party 
support, as well as heads of governments appointed by a president elected 
by popular vote (French prime ministers in the Fifth Republic, for instance) 
and prime ministers in a coalition context. These leaders wish to strengthen 
the role of the government over that of the party: they therefore stress one or 
both of the need for national cohesion and the managerial or technical role 
of the government. On both grounds, these leaders will try to diminish the 
dependence of the government on parties. 
Party leaders who are not government leaders naturally have the 
opposite objective: they want to ensure that the interdependence between 
government and party is maximised and that this interdependence is 
exercised to the benefit of the party. As party leaders exercise their 
influence indirectly largely through the ministers of their party, they may 
attempt to remove many policy matters from the governmental area. 
Ultimately, the power of party leaders in coalition situations rests mainly on 
manipulation and on the threat of bringing down the government. 
Third, leaders who are both government and party leaders have the 
greatest resources, but they can exploit this situation differently. They have 
a choice between two broad options: they can push government-party 
relationships in the direction of governmental dominance: this may lead to 
discontent in the party. They can attempt to realise an equilibrium between 
party and government by balancing the ‘political’ demands of the party 
against the ‘technical’ demands of the government. This is likely to be the 
more effective strategy in the long run. 
e) Policy Fields 
Government-supporting party relationships may also vary across policy 
fields, but probably more because of differences in process than because of 
the substance of decisions. Thus, while foreign affairs are generally 
regarded as belonging to the governmental rather than to the party ‘area’, 
some issues, such as those related to the European Community, have 
been hotly debated in most Western European parties; the same has been 
true, in some countries at least and in particular in Britain, of issues related 
to nuclear disarmament. Specifically, parties seem to be less involved in 
three types of situations, emergencies, technical matters and 
implementation. These situations may even be regarded as secondary by 
parties: as a result governments are often able to acquire some autonomy 
in this respect by default. 
The limitations to the influence exercised by parties on governments 
(and, to an extent of the influence which governments can exercise on 
parties) can therefore be severe, even in parliamentary systems. What we 
find is a large variety of types of party government: the truth about party 
government is thus that there are many facets or realities of what is 
basically an umbrella concept. 
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III. 
6. The many Realities of ‘Party Government’: The Space  
of Party Government Relationships 
Since there are many types of party-government, it is natural that we should 
look for means of classifying them. Reflection on similarities and differences 
suggests that such a classification can be based on two broad dimensions 
which might be labelled the dimension of autonomy v. interdependence, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, when there is interdependence, the 
dimension of the direction of the dependence. 
First, government-supporting party relationships vary according to the 
extent to which the government and the supporting party or parties are 
autonomous from each other. There are obviously degrees here: there may 
be autonomy in some fields and dependence in others or thee may be 
autonomy on one plane (appointments for instance) and interdependence on 
another (policy-making for instance). 
Second, where these is interdependence between governments and 
supporting parties, this interdependence can vary from one extreme of total 
dependence of the government on the supporting party or parties to the 
other extreme of total dependence of the party or parties on the government. 
There is a dimension here as parties have often been set up with a view to 
helping governments and in particular leaders to maintain and even increase 
their hold on a nation: such parties are dependent on the government, 
although the extent of this dependence will vary both from country to 
country and over time in the same country. Admittedly, this dimension 
appears to be relevant only if parties and governments are not autonomous 
from each other: in practice, as the question of autonomy arises on each of 
the planes of which parties and governments relate to each other, it is right 
to refer to a two-dimensional space in order to define the nature of 
government-party relationships in individual countries at various moments in 
time. 
This space is best represented by a triangle in which one side constitutes 
the ‘direction of dependence’ axis while the other two sides join each other 
at the autonomy end of the ‘autonomy-interdependence’ dimension and at 
the middle point with respect to the ‘direction of dependence’ dimension. 
This is another way of saying that the two dimensions are analytically 
interconnected since one is a condition of the other, but also that, given the 
ambiguous character of real-world relationships between governments and 
supporting parties, the two dimensions remain distinct in practice. 
The location of countries with respect to the two dimensions is 
determined by the relationships between the governments and the 
supporting parties with respect to the three sets of activities which were 
described earlier. Let us consider how given positions are occupied on the 
plane of appointments, for instance. Countries in which governments are 
appointed separately from parties and where governments do not interfere or 
interfere very little with the composition of the party leadership will tend to 
be located towards the top of the triangle, near the autonomy end of the 
‘autonomy-interdependence’ dimension. Countries in which the party 
appoints the ministers but where the ministers do not affect the composition 
of the party leadership group are located towards the bottom right-hand 
corner of the triangle near the interdependence end of the ‘autonomy-
interdependence’ dimension and near the ‘party dominant’ end of the 
‘direction of dependence’ dimension. Where the government has set up a 
party whose top leadership group it controls while the membership of the 
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government remains independent from the party, the country is located also 
close to the interdependence end of the ‘autonomy-interdependence’ 
dimension, but near the government-dominant end of the ‘direction of 
dependence’ dimension, that is to say towards the bottom left-hand corner 
of the triangle. Similar remarks can be made about the location of countries 
in the space with respect to policy-making and to patronage. To obtain an 
overall picture of the location of countries in the triangle, party-government 
relationships with respect to the three planes have naturally to be taken 
jointly into account. 
7. Broad Patterns of Party-Government Relationships 
We can now turn to specific examples of types of party government. In 
general, given the fact that the position of a country overall is based on the 
location of that country on all three planes, positions at the three corners of 
the triangle are unlikely to be often occupied; but positions in the area of 
these three corners are likely to be. Near the top corner are governments 
which are autonomous with respect to parties (as well as, conversely, of 
parties which are autonomous with respect to governments): this situation 
corresponds to a form of ‘separation’ between the two sets of bodies. This 
is likely to occur primarily where the executive has a source of legitimacy of 
its own, as in some monarchical systems where the government has a 
‘bureaucratic’ character (there were examples in 19th century Central 
Europe); this also occurs in some presidential systems, if the ‘party’ of the 
president is in effect sharply distinct from the ‘party’ which nominally 
supports the president in the legislature, a case which approximates that of 
the United States. Few parliamentary systems are likely to occupy such 
positions. 
The second extreme type of government-party relationships is that of 
the dependent party: cases of this kind are located towards the bottom left-
hand corner of the triangle close to the ‘party-dependent’ end of the 
‘direction of dependence’ dimension. The supporting party is docile, as in 
the case of a single party system set up by a leader who wishes both to 
mobilise and to control the population, a situation which has occurred 
frequently in Black Africa, but the real prototype has been the Mexican PRI. 
The dependence of parties on the government in Britain had this character 
in the late 18th century; gradually, British parties acquired greater authority 
as parties, but the Conservative party has remained markedly dependent on 
its leader. Thus there may be ‘fusion’ of the leadership of the party and of 
the government n this case, but this fusion benefits the government rather 
than the party. Moreover, the policy of the party tends to be decided by the 
leader and a small entourage, the party playing only a limited part, and 
primarily when in opposition. The Conservative party is thus at some 
distance, but not very far, from the ‘government-dominant’ corner of the 
triangle. In the case of the British Labour party, party influence is larger, 
both with respect to the composition of the government and with respect to 
policy-making. Yet the governmental leadership of the Labour party has 
always insisted on its right to implement and even to shape party policy and 
the party rank-and-file is often reduced to manifesting its discontent without 
being able to force alternative policies on the leadership. 
The other bottom corner of the triangle was traditionally occupied by 
Communist States, as the party leadership, rather than the governmental 
leadership, dictated policy and as the former appointed the latter (and 
indeed appointed, through the nomenklatura system, members of the public 
service well below the governmental level). This system was also a case of 
‘fusion’, but of a ‘fusion’ exercised to the benefit of the party rather than to 
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the benefit of the government or, to use the Communist terminology, of the 
‘State apparatus’. Yet Communist States are not the only group of 
countries in which substantial dominance of the party over the government 
has existed for a long period: another group is constituted by many 
Continental European coalition governments of parliamentary systems in 
which both the selection of ministers and the determination of policies are 
markedly influenced by the parties supporting the government; in some of 
these countries, though not in all, patronage is also widespread. These 
systems are thus located fairly close to the right-hand corner of the triangle 
where Communist countries tended to be found before the late 1980s. 
Admittedly, there is some governmental autonomy and a degree of 
counterbalancing governmental influence: ministers are able to put some 
pressure on their party on policy matters; there is also occasionally some 
leeway with respect to governmental appointments, at least in some 
countries, as a result of the choice of persons coming from outside strict 
party ranks: but in general the party leadership exercises considerable 
influence. 
Finally, some governments occupy positions close to the centre of the 
triangle, in that they are characterised by a a degree of autonomy while 
retaining links with the parties supporting them. This situation typically 
described the case of Swedish social democratic governments as well as 
occasionally the governments of other Scandinavian countries. Such 
‘central’ positions in the triangle are not occupied frequently, however. This 
is  because they result from the existence of a subtle equilibrium between 
‘autonomy’ and ‘interdependence’ which neither governments nor supporting 
parties are generally prepared to accept. Thus ‘central’ positions have 
tended to be transitional: they occur mainly as governments are losing 
some of the autonomy which they held previously, leaving some scope for 
manoeuvre only at the margin. The Fifth French Republic is a case in point. 
De Gaulle attempted to instore governmental autonomy in order to combat 
what he regarded as having been unacceptable party dominance over the 
government in the past. Quickly, however, autonomy was replaced by party 
dependence on the government, as a docile Gaullist party was set up to 
ensure support for the government in parliament: France thus came to 
occupy a position not unlike that of Britain under the Conservatives, indeed 
even closer than Britain to the ‘government-dominant’ corner of the triangle. 
Government-party relations subsequently moved somewhat from that 
corner: with the Socialist Party in power in the 1980s, government-
supporting party relationships in France resembled those of Britain under 
Labour governments, that is to say be at some distance from the 
‘government-dominant’ corner of the triangle, but also at a substantial 
distance from the mid-point of reciprocal influence and substantial 
autonomy wich has tended to characterise Swedish social democratic 
governments. 
The examples both of types and of moves which have been given here 
are naturally based primarily on general impressions rather than on detailed 
evidence: such evidence has yet to be collected. But these examples show 
that the differences are substantial and that it is possible to discover a 
number of positions around which many countries gravitate, even if concrete 
cases depart somewhat from these ‘ideal’ positions. 
Government-party relationships are a central topic in democratic 
societies (as well indeed as in non-democratic polities) and in particular in 
parliamentary systems. This central topic can be analysed rigorously only if 
one goes beyond the simple remark that parties develop programmes which 
are expected to be implemented by the governments which these parties 
support. One must examine the relative autonomy and interdependence of 
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governments and supporting parties, however defined, with respect to 
policies, to appointments, and to patronage and one must look at these 
matters over time. One must then consider the complex interlocking factors 
which account for these relationships remembering that parties have often 
been set up not so much to put forward the views of the people, but to 
ensure that governments implement programmes which the people is only 
presumed to prefer. Moreover, even in the best cases of party influence, 
governments have been involved in many activities in which parties could not 
be or did not wish to be truly concerned. Naturally enough, the desire to see 
parties exercising real pressure on governments persists: it is a requirement 
if representative government is to be achieved. What needs also to be 
discovered are the ways in which and the specific matters on which party 
pressure on government is most often exercised. By giving a strong 
empirical base to the analysis, the normative reflection on party-government 
will be enhanced and one will be able to come to a better understanding of 
the mechanisms of parliamentary government and of the ways in which 
these mechanisms can be improved. 
